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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AERONAUTICS:

WARSAW CONVENTION-

Warsaw v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 2327 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that an airline passenger who suffers a hearing loss as
a result of routine repressurization of an aircraft cabin during landing
cannot recover from the airline under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, which established
carrier liability for injuries proximately caused by some "accident" occurring on board the plane or during the process of embarkation or
debarkation.
The passenger had an upper respiratory tract infection at the time
of the flight in question, but was otherwise in good health. His level of
hearing was essentially normal although his left ear had been operated
on 13 years earlier. The passenger's left ear became blocked during the
aircraft's descent for landing and he had completely lost the hearing in
his left ear by the time he arrived at the air terminal. Subsequent
medical treatment failed to restore his hearing and his condition was
diagnosed as permanent damage to the nerve of the left inner ear. The
airline was sued by the passenger under the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, for damages as a
result of his hearing loss.
The question before the court concerned a judicial interpretation
of an article of the Warsaw Convention.' Articlie 17 of the Convention
provides: "The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage there sustained took place on board the aircraft or
in the course of any operation of embarking or disembarking." 2 The
Montreal Agreement 3 made no changes governing the pre-conditions
for liability under Article 17. The Agreement did, however, waive the

In 1934, the United States became a party to the Warsaw Convention, a treaty
subsequently signed by 107 nations, applying to "all international transportation of
persons . . . performed by aircraft for hire .. " Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929,
49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (effective for the United States Oct. 29,
1934), art. 1(1).
2 Id. art. 17.
3 Approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board, May 13, 1966, Order E-23680, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). The Montreal Agreement applies to international flights which
involve a location in the United States.
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defenses formerly available under Article 20(1) 4 and create an absolute
liability standard for injuries proximately caused by some "accident"
occurring on board the aircraft, or during the embarkation or
debarkation process.
After determining that the plaintiffs hearing loss was proximately
caused by the routine repressurization of the cabin during descent, the
court turned to the issue of whether the repressurization was an "accident" under the provisions of Article 17. It was noted by the court
that a factual situation in which an injury was caused by a normal and
routine flight procedure had not previously been dealt with by a
federal or state court.
Although the specific question of an airline's liability for passenger
injuries proximately caused by routine flight procedures- was one of
first impression, it had previously been determined that the Montreal
Agreement imposed liability on carriers for damages resulting from circumstances beyond their control such as sabotage, hijacking and terrorist attack.5 In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 6 the court
held that the Montreal Convention covered hijacking and that acts of
persons other than the airline or the passenger were comprehended by
the treaty. Liability was imposed upon the airline although identifiable
independent acts caused the injury to the passenger.
A terrorist attack upon passengers waiting to complete preboarding
security checks was held by the court in Evangelinos v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,7 to fall outside the coverage of Article 17. The reasoning of the Evangelinos court was that the use of the term "embarkation" in Article 17 is limited to a geographically and temporally circumscribed space.
The Warsaw court observed that the term "accident" in Article 17
had been held in Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines8 to embrace
an action brought by a passenger who was injured by stepping out of
an airplane while the loading ramp was being removed. The Chutter
4 Article 20(1) provided that a carrier would have as a defense that it had: "taken
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them
to take such measures."
' See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y,
1972), affd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) and Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 560 (1967).
6 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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court stated that the incident was an "accident" in that it occurred
either on the airplane or in the embarkation process.
The common thread running through all of the cited cases was
seen by the Warsaw court to be the fact that the proximate cause of
each of the injuries was an "out-of-the-ordinary" unanticipated event.
Whether the injury resulted from negligence, an unclassifiable occurrence causing a crash, or the intentional acts of third parties, the common characteristic was an event which in each case was not within the
normal and preferred mode of operation for the flight. However, the
Warsaw court was faced with an injury resulting from a change in
cabin pressure and such repressurization is a part of the normal, anticipated and established method of procedure on a commercial airline
flight. The court concluded that the routine repressurization of a jet
aircraft cabin during its descent from high altitude if performed in the
ususal and expected manner with no complications or external disruptions, is not within the normal interpretation given by federal courts to
the term "accident" under the provisions of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement.
Thus, Warsaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. has achieved two
basic results. First, it has determined that an event occurring on an
aircraft cannot be termed an accident if it is a normal and expected
occurrence. An event must be unusual or unexpected to constitute an
accident and is not an accident if it arises exlusively from the
passenger's state of health. Second, it has held that an injury which
results from normal, expected and necessary changes in the operation
of the aircraft, when such changes were performed by the plane's crew
in the usual and prudent manner, is not covered by the presently effective version of the Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Montreal Agreement.
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